Operation C-Major

By Ashwin Venugopal -

 





Introduction

Operaion C-Major is an information threat campaign targeting India. It has stolen passport scans, photo IDs, and tax information of many high-ranking Indian officers as well as non-Indian military officials based in the country. Although the attacks are highly targeted but, they lacked sophistication in their tools and techniques. 

The threat actor generally uses malicious emails to penetrate a network. It also exploits an old vulnerability via an easily traceable malware, allowing any researcher to map out its network infrastructure. Despite its sloppiness, the threat actors still managed to steal at least 16 gigabytes' worth of data from 160 targets.

It is believed that the attackers are linked with Pakistan and also goes for the information available in the mobiles of their victims. 

Methodology

Similar to the other targeted attacks, Operation C-major also uses emails as their entry point. They gathers all the information about their victims' interests and favorite subjects they would like to click on, to use for their advantage. They would send a malicious email disguised as an original file, to a military official of a foreign country assigned to India. When the PDF files are opened, an exploit is triggered, dropping a Trojan connecting to and communicating with the C&C server. This Trojan is capable of keylogging and password theft. The threat actors create an unusual case, where the source code can be known easily, implying that they are either not sophisticated or not knowledgeable or both. The data exfiltrated from these targeted attacks are:
  1. Passport scans and other photo IDs
  2. Salary and taxation data
  3. Army strategic and tactical documents
  4. Army training documentation
  5. Personal photos

Conclusion

All the gathered information about Operation C-Major shows that they are rather smaller players in the game of targeted attacks, lacking in sophistication which they make up with tenacity, persistence, and clever social engineering. They attack regardless of any user, rank or position, making anyone susceptible to become a weak security link. Network defenders must be ready to prevent or minimize the damage of such attacks. Also, people using networks should be made aware and knowledgeable of all types of attacks via proper awareness training. 













































































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